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This paper is of heuristic and explorative character. Our aim is to ex- 
plain a new conceptual tool for the study of infinitary logics (infinitary 
languages) and to illustrate its uses. For the former purpose, explicit 
formal definitions may be more of an obstacle than a help, and for the 
latter purpose strict proofs are not necessary, either, especially as our 
illustrations of  the power of the new approach pertain to the systemati- 
zation of known results rather than to the establishment of new ones. 
For these reasons, our discussion will be in this paper ather intuitive and 
discursive and will mostly dispense with strict definitions and proofs. 
Our starting point is the observation that most currantly studied infi- 
nitary languages fetal.9, certain finitistic features which are not needed 
either for syntactical or semantical purposes. RougiAy speaking, infinilary 
formulas are still thought of  as having been built up by finite or transfinite 
recursion from atomic formulas (see e.g. [ 1 ] ). This tends to impose various 
finitistic features on tile resulting formulas. For instance, if the only infi- 
nitary element in a language is a rule for forming infinite conjunctions and 
disjunctions, the foP(~wing finiteness properU, holds in it: 
(F. 1 ) Any descending chain of  proper subformutas i finite. 
Even when it is also allowed to bind an infinity of variables to a single 
quantifier, a weaker finiteness property holds (even if we allow the for- 
mation of  subformulas through the instantiation of  only some of  the 
variables bound to the same infinitary quantifier): 
(F.2) In any descending chain of  proper subformulas, there is only a 
finite numb~*r of changes of  character of  the initial quantifier 
(i.e., changes from a formula beginning with an existential 
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quantifier to a fo r l  ula beginning with a universal one, or vice 
versa). 
For instance, all the familiar languages L~ x satisfy (F.2). For in L~x pre- 
cisely the two kinds of infinitary formation rules just mentioned ale used, 
viz. the formation of conjunctions and disjunctions of fewer than ~c mem- 
bers and the binding of fewer than ~. variables to a single quantifier. (In 
the notation "LKa' ,  r and ;k may either be two cardinals or the two smal- 
lest ordinals with these respective cardinalities.) 
There are certain infinitary languages, for instance languages with so- 
called game quantifiers (Henkin quantifiers) which do not satisfy (F.2) 
(see [2,6] ). However, all the known languages seem to satisfy an analo- 
gous requirement for propositional connectives: 
(F.3) In any descending chain of  proper subformulas, there is only 
a finite number of changes from ^  to v or vice versa. 
For instance, the usual game quantifier languages Lc; satisfy (F.3). It has 
been brought to our attention~ however, that Peter Aczel ~unpublished 
work) has stt, died languages uot satisfying (F.3). It seems that his "pseudo- 
formulas" are formulas of  languages considered here. (See also the Note 
appended to the end of this paper.) 
The first main ?oint we want to make here is that all these finiteness 
requirements are u~mecessary for the development of  an adequate seman- 
tics for an infinitary language. In the same way as game-theoretical defi- 
nitions of truth and satisfaction can dispense with requirement (F.2), 
they work perfectly satisfactorily even when its propositional counterpart 
(F.3) is not fulfilled. The upshot is that there is no need at all for thinking 
of infinitary formulas as being constructed step by ordinal step from 
atomic ones. 
The same point can be put in another way. lnfinitary formulas are by 
any token set-theoretical objects. The only main theoretical constraint on 
their syntactical structure is that they will have to admit of reasonable 
definitions of truth and satisfaction. The remarks just made amount to 
saying that certain vestigial finiteness properties are not needed for this 
purpose. One constructive consequence is that the "formulas" of  an in- 
finitary language may have the form of  an almost arbitrary" tree as far as 
its subformula structure is concerned. 
More specifically, we obtain a new hierarchy of infinitary langua~zes 
N~,  where t~ is an arbitrary but fixed cardinal (or tile smallest ordinal 
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with this cardinality) and a an ordinal. The formulas of N~ are defined 
as follows; 
Let L be a finitary first-order language, V the set of its variables, and 
A the set of its atomic formulas. 
A formula of N~,~ is a 4-tuple 
whe/e 
(i) (T, ~r )  is a tree of length da  such that 
(a) through each element  of  T there passes at least one branch with 
a maximal element; 
(b) if the rank of  t, t' ~ T is a limit ordinal and t, t' have the same set 
of predecessors, then t = t'. It follows that T has a least element. 
(ii) S=A u {~,v,A} u({~,V} X V). 
(iii) g is a mapping from T into S. 
(iv) g satisfies the following conditions; 
(a) g(t) ~ A l i f t  is maximal, 
(b) t has only one immediate successor iff 
g(t )E  ~} U ({~1, V} X It'), 
(c) if g(t) ~ (v,  ^ ) ,  t has fewer than r successors. 
For each t ~ T there is a unique 4-tuple q~' = (T' ,  ~T',  g" S) such that 
T' = ( t' ~ T: t d r t' ~ , d r" = ~ T IT',  and g' = g l T'.  q~' is a formula since 
it satisfies conditions (i)--(iv), above. ~'  is a subformula of ~. Thus each. 
t ~ T determines a unique subformu!a q~' of ~. The rank of ~' ,  considered 
as a subformula of ~ is the rank of  t in T. 
Intuitive!y, (T, dr~ and g give the ~abformula structure of ~. The 
fuuclion g tells whether a given subformula is a disjunction, conjunction, 
negation, existentially quantified formula, or universally quantified for- 
mula. The restrictions (a) - (c )  follow directly from this idea. These no- 
lions, as well as tile notion of bound variable, etc., can be defined pre- 
cisely in the obvious way. 
From a formula written in the usual notation (see for instance formu- 
las qb 1 and ~2,  below) we can immediately obtain a corresponding T, ~r ,  
and g. Although there are several trees corresponding to a given usual 
notation, these trees are isomorphic. Vice versa, from a given 4-tuple 
satisfying ( i ) - ( iv)  we obtain the usual notation as follows: Let • = (T, 
d r ,  g, S) be a formula and F the set of its subformulas of rank 1, and t O 
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the least elerr.ent of T. If g((o) = V or A, ~p ~s denoted byVF orAF, 
respectively. Especially, if F= (@1, ~2 ), 4~ can be denoted by @1 v ~P2 
or @1 ^  ~P2, respectively, l f F= (@' } and g(t O) = ~,  (3, x), or <V, x), ~P 
is denoted by ~~P', (3x)@', or (Vx)@', respectively. If g(( 0 ) = ~, ~ A, @ 
is denoted by ~p and called an atomic formola. 
It follows from the definitiol! of a formula that we are not allowing 
quantifiers with more than one variable bound to them. It is also seen 
that the languages N~ are cumulaiive: N~a contains Nat ~ as soon as t¢ )3 .  
anda~ ft. 
I f (~  D ~)  is taken to mean only that the set of  models in which ~P is 
true is included in the set of those in which • is true, it cannot be defined 
as (~alp v ~).  The two are equivalent only i( q~ is determinate (true or 
false; see the definition of these notions below). The same holds mutatis 
mutandis of  equivalences. However, in the sequel we shall use "D" and 
"-=" only to bind determinate formulas. 
With each sentence • of one of  these languages and with a model 
we can associate a semantical game G(,I~, ~ ) in the usual way (ct\ [411. 
There are two players, Myself and Natu~:. We start from ~ and proceed 
to its successive proper subformulas (or substitution instances of sub- 
formulas). ~-~ disjunction marks my move: I choose a disjunct with respect 
to which the game is continued. A conjunction similarly marks Nature's 
move. A negatl, m sign marks an interchange of the roles of the players. 
An existential qvantifier marks my move: 1 choose an individual from 
the domain of ~/ to be the value of  the variable bound to the quantifier, 
which is then omitted. A universal quantifier marks a similar nlove by 
Nature. I f  a play of  the game produces a true atomic sentence (or the 
negation of a false one), I have wor and Nature has lost. If it produces a
false atomic sentence (or the negation of a true one), Nature has won and 
I have lost. We can stipulate that this is a zero-sum game. 
If no such formula emerges (that is, if the length of a play is a limit 
ordinal), we have several possibilities to define the result of a play. It will 
turn out, however, that most of the results below concerning mfinitary 
constituents are largely independent of  this definition. It is interesting 
to note that different definitions yield in fact somewhat different languages 
This kind of  flexibility as to the definition of truth does not occur in most 
of the familiar infinitary languages. 
Our basic idea is that the truth of' l ,  in ~ is to be defined as my having 
a winning strategy in this game. Since strategies are functions of a kind 
that can be specified set-theoretically, the existence of a winning strategy 
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is a well-defined set-theoretical notion. (We are omitting lots of detail 
here.) But this means that truth can be defined for sentences like ~, and 
satisfaction follows suit.  
The simplest possibility for defining winning and losing in the games 
we have described is probably the following one. Let G(~, 9)2 ) be the 
game connected with the sentence ~b over the model ~l~ whose rules were 
indicated above. Let ~ be the set of my strategies and II the set of Nature's 
strategies, Let (o,~) he the play of the game determined by the strategies 
oE  ]~ and ~ II. 
It is now t~mpting to define my payoff function 
f :  E x PI~ { I , -1 )  
as fo!lows: 
+ l if a true atomic sentence (or the negation of a 
false one) emerges, 
(+) -- 1 if a false atomic sentence (or the negation of  a 
y(o, rr) = true one) emerges, 
+ I if neither happens, in other words, if the length 
of  the play is a limit ordinal. 
It is the third ease that leaves open tile door to variation here. Instead 
of the definition of the payoff function just indicated we might be 
tempted to define f :  I; X n ~ { 1, 0, - 1 ) as follows (instead of (+)): 
+ l if a true atomic sentence (or the negation of  a 
false one) emerges, 
(++) .fro, rr) = - 1 if a false atomic sentence (or the negation of  a 
title one) emerges, 
0 otherwise. 
This characterization embodies the idea that if the length of a play is a 
limit ordinal, neither player wins. 
However, neither of those definitions is fully satisfactory. (Their un- 
satisfactory character is illustrated by some of the examples to be offered 
below.) Basically, (+) is unsatisfactory because it does not maintain sym- 
metry between the two players, and (++) is unsatisfactory because it does 
not ask which player is to be blamed for the avoidance of atomic formulas. 
The breakdown of (F.3) opens to us hereto untapped possibilities of 
making the definit'on of winning and losing more flexible by distinguish- 
ing from each other different ypes of plays in which neither an atomic 
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formula nor the negation of one emerges. The intuitive idea which we 
shall capitalize on is that this kind of play may be the "'fault" of one of 
the players in the sense that he can avoict defeat only by avoidinl~ atomic 
formulas. This idea we may try to codify as follows, We consider In'st the 
languages N~ : 
+ 1 if a true atomic sentence (or the negation of a 
i 
false one) emerges, 
- i f  a false atomic sentence (or the negation of a 
true one) emerges, 
I 
+ 1 if  Nature chooses a nonatomic formula in pref- 
erence to a~ atomic one (or to the negation of  
(*) Y(a,Tr) = an atomic one) an infinite number of  times but 
I do not, 
- I  if 1 choose a nonatomic formuk~ in preference 
I to an atomic one (or to the negation of  an 
atomic one) an infinite nu:nber of times but Na- 
ture does not, 
0 if both players o choose an infinite number of 
times. 
Actually the %rmulation above is not the most appropriate one. The 
following is a little sharper: 
+ 1 i f  a true atomic sentence (or the neg,*tion of a 
false one) emerges, 
-1  i f  a false atomic sentence (or the negation of a 
true one) emerges, 
+ 1 i f  Nature chooses an infinitely deep conjune~ 
an infinite number of times in preference to a 
finitely deep conjunct but 1 do not choose a 
disjunct an infinite number of times, 
- 1 if the reverse happens, 
0 if both players use the propositional rules an 
infinite number of times so as to choose an 
infinitely deep formula in preference to a 
finitely deep forint la. 
If we consider the languages N~ a in general, we must rep ace the third 
clause in the definition (**) o f f  by the following (in the case that neither 
( ** )  .~a: )  = 
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a~l atomic sentence nor the negation of one emerges): 
(***) f(a,  ~r) = ÷ 1 if Nature chooses a deeper formula in preference 
to a shallower one more times than l do. 
Here "more times" must be understood ordinally, that is, by reference 
to the length of the sequence of  applications of the game rule for conjunc 
tions. Likewise, "deeper" and "shallower" must be understood ordinally. 
The last two clauses of (**) have to be generalized in the same way. By 
Nature's choosing a sentence in preference to another we of  course mean 
an application of the game rule for finite or infinite conjunctions which 
yields the former while it could have yielded the latter, and analogously 
for my choices. 
Notice how it is precisely the failure of  (F.3) that opens the door to 
the last three cases of the last definition of f .  This in fact enables us to 
strengthen the new infinite languages considerably as compared to their 
neighbours in the hierarchy (L~ a }- 
We shall say that the winner of the play <o,~r) is Myself if f(o,~r) = +1. 
Nature if f(o,~r) = - I ,  while neither wins i f f (n, lr)  = 0. 
My strategy a ~ ~ is a winning one ifff(o,~r) = +I for every ~r~ H, and 
likewise for Nature's winning strategies. 4, is true in ~// if I have a winning 
strategy in the game G(el,, ~ ), false i f  Nature has one. 
Both players cannot have a winning strategy in any one game CK¢F, ~IIl). 
On the other hand, there are games in which neither player has a winning 
strategy: An example of the latter kind is offered by the game G(cI,, ~ ) 
where 
4, = ~ ^  (4  v (~0 ^  (4  v ...) .. .)), 
is an atomic sentence which is true in ~,  and ~ is an atomic sentence 
which is false in ~.  
Accordingly, in the new languages N~ the law of noncentradiction 
holds, but not the law of excluded middle. 
The games defined above can be applied also to familiar languages L~ x, 
Lo, and the above notion of winning coincides with the familiar notion 
of winrfing for these languages, for in the games connected with these 
languages, f(o,rr) :m 0 for all o, 7r. Thus the determinateness of a game is 
in the old games equivalent with the condition 
max rain .flu, It) = min max f(o, ~r) 
But this is not always true in the new oner. as the game G(4,, ~ ) in the 
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example above shows: In this indeterminate game 
max rain f(a,  7r) = rain max r io,  ~r) = O. 
Some of the effects of  our choice of the precise definition o f  winning 
and losing may be seen by considering the following sample consequanees 
of the definition we adopted. 
Tile notion of finiteness can be defined in the language N,~, , .  For 
example, the following sentence cl,~ is true in a model ~ iff the number 
of individuals of ~l having property P is finite: 
(Vx o) (~/'x o v 
(Vx l ) (~/ '  % vx~ =x o v 
('¢x~) (~Px 2 v x 2 =x~ v ::~ =x o v 
._))  . . . ) ,  
If we had used (+), this sentence would he true also when there are an 
infinity of individuals with the property P. If we had used (++), it would 
have been neither true nor false in such a situation. If we had used (*). 
the following closely related sentence would be neitl:,~r true nor false in 
the same c~,se: 
(~,x~) (~Px o v 
(Vx~) ((~Px~ v x~ =Xo)V 
(Vx 2 ) ( (~?x  2 v x 2 = x I v x 2 = x a ) v 
...)) . . . ) .  
To take another example, let us suppose that the relation R establishes 
a linear ordering. The fact flint R is a well-ordering can be expressed al- 
ready in the language N~l ~ by the following sentevce @2 : 
(Vx 0) (x o = 0 v 
(Vx 1 ) (Rxtx  o v x I = 0 v 
(Vx 2 ) (Rx2x  1 v x :  = 0 v 
(VX 3 ) (Rx3x  2 V X 3 = 0 V 
...)) ...)). 
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This example shows that, with our specific definition of  truth based 
on (***), the language Nw~ ~ is at least in some respects much stronger 
than L~ (see [8]) .  How much stronger it is remains to be studied, 
Again (+) and (++) would have given different results here. In case 
there is an infinite descending chain in the model, (+) would make the 
last sample sentence true while (++) would make it neither true nor false. 
And again (*) would make tke truth-value of our sentence sensitive to 
bzackefing. 
Another consequence of the above definition (***) is that 6ertain in- 
ffmite formulas have a prenex normal ?orm. For example, the sentence 
dP I is equivalent to the following sentence: 
(Vx o ) (Vx t ) (¥x  2 } ... ( -Px  o v 
~Px  1 vx  l =X0v  
~Px 2 VX 2 =x I Vx 2 =x  e v 
,. .).  
The sentence ~2 is equivalent to: 
(Vx o) (¥x~) (Vx 2) ... (x o = 0 v Rx~ x o v x 1 = 0 v 
Rx2x  1 VX 2 =Ov 
...).  
This shows that some N~ ~ sentences are equivalent to L~j~t sen- 
tences (wh ch are not L~ sentences). This does not hold for all N~j,~ 
sentences. N~I w is not reducible to the language L~lo l ,  and probably 
not even to L G . 
Prima facie the new hierarchy {N~ ) and the old one {L~)  may 
seem almost completely incomparable. As was already pointed out, all 
the members of L~, satisfy (F.2) and (F.3), neither of which holds for 
any N~,  a ;~ w. On the other hand, in any sentence of N~x each 
quantifier is within the scope of fewer than ~ other quantifiers, which 
is a stronger estriction than that imposed on any L~,, V-> cox. For in- 
stance, L~l w t is in this respect stronger than N~, l~ , even though the 
latter allows for an infinite sequence of  nested quantifiers. It will turn 
out, however, that the two hierarchies are not as completely dispa:ate 
as might appear from these observations. In fact, the languages N~ and 
L~ (tot an:y fixed ~ ~ w) are related closely to each other semantically, 
even if their syntax is different. 
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If ~ve consider some sentence that is like ~l  or 4 2 , above, but con- 
tains infinite alten~ations of quantifiers, and its premex form, we see that 
the language N~,lw is also closely connected with the game qu,'mtifier 
language Lt3 which allows for a countably long prenex sequence ofquan- 
tiflers. Further work is needed to establish whether the extra freedom 
which Noq ~ allows (in that it makes possible also for the propositional 
structure of a sentence to be infinitely deep) resultS'in an actual gain in 
model-theoretical expressibility. 
In general an important question in evaluating the new languages i
whether their richer syntax allows for a sharper insight into the structure 
of infinitary languages. We submit that such a keener insight is obtaineu 
(at least in certain cases) through a g~neralization f the notion of con- 
stituent from finitary first-order logic (i.e., from L~w ) to the l~ew langu- 
ages. In fact, we can generalize the characterization f a constituent. In 
Lw~, a constituent has the following form (cf. [4] ): 
(1) C= iAi (~x 0 ) Cti(x O) ^  (Vx o) iV  Cti(xo)" 
Here C has a certain depth d (i.e., certain number of  layers of quantifiers). 
The Cti(xe) are attributive constituents of depth d -  1 and with x 0 as 
their only fi-ee variable. The set I indexes ala arbitrary subset of  all such 
attributive co,~stituents. They are defined in general just like constituents: 
(2) Ct(xo, . . . ,xk_a)= Ah (3x~)Cth(x o..... xk_ l ,x  k) 
^ (Vxk) t, Ve~ Ct~(Xo ..... xk-  t, xk) 
^ IX (.+.)A/(x o ..... xk i ) .  
Here the Ct h (x0, ... xk_ 1" ~" ~ ) have tile depth d - 1 if Ct(x 0 ..... xk.- 1 ) 
has the depth d. TLe AI, j E J ,  denote all the atomic formulas which can 
be built out of the basic predicates (we assume that they are finite in 
numbe: ; and ofx  0 ..... xk I and which contain x k_ t. The (±) indicates 
that some of them may be negated. When the depth of Ct(x 0 ..... xk- 1 ) 
is zero, (2) reduces to 
A (±)Ai(Xo, . . . ,Xk_I) ,  
thus giving us a basis for a recursive definition of all constituents and 
attributive constituents. (The former can be defined by omitting tile 
requirement on xk~ 1 from the description of ~2).) 
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Now a similar characterization clearly works (with obvious modifica- 
tions; e.g., we must omit the reference to a recursive definition) for each 
of the ianguages N~,  From this characterization it is immediately seen 
how the precise definition of  a constituent or an attributive constituent 
(as a 4-tuple) of depth o~ is obtained. The new cardinality restrictions that 
have to be given here are the following: 
( i ) /7< ~, 
(ii) if ;~ is the cardinality of the set of non-logical constants, 2x < g. 
The restriction (ii) replaces the requirement in the finite case that the 
number of non-logical constants is finite, If we give up this restrictio i, 
there will not exist any constituents with the full set of  non-logical con- 
stants in languages N ,~ with some values of K, even though we can s!fll 
build up constituents containing only members o f  some fixed subset of 
all non-logical constants. Although we shall in tbi~ paper initially assume, 
for simplicity, that the restriction (ii) is satisfied, it could be given ul,. 
qhere will then still be constituents which are true in countable models. 
Tkey are constituents which are of countable "breadth" ( i .e. 1 and each 
H are countable) but which may include uncountably long conjunctions 
of atomic formulas and their negations. 
For ordinals a > ¢o, constituents can likewise be defined in a straight- 
forward manner. 
The main properties of  the constituents C~ E N~ (of depth 6~ < x, 
K regular) show their importance for the theory of  infinitary languages. 
We ~hall ist some of tl',em in the following five lemmas and indicate only 
briefly afterwards how they could be established, 
Lemma 1. The games connected with the constituents Cx,~ are determin~ 
ate, i,e., one oJ the two players has a winning strategy. 
Lemma 2. One and only one C~.~ is satisfied b~ a gicen model ~ o f  an 
infinite cardinality < ~. 
Corollary. A given k-tuple of  individuals o f  a model of  an infinite cardinal- 
ity < K satisfies one and only one constituent and attributive constituent 
o f  depth t~ with k free variables. 
I.emma 3, I f  C~ is satisfiable, it is satisfiable in some model o f  cardinality 
<K. 
Lemma 4. CK~ is satisfiable i f f  all it is not trivially inconsistent. 
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Lemma 5. Two models o f  cardinality ~o satisfy the same C~l w if]" they 
are isomorphic. 
Generalization. Two models of  cardinality to# satisfy the same C~ a i f f  
they are isomorphic; 
Of these results, Lemma 3 is a kind of downward Skolem- Lbwenheim 
result. Lemma 4 is a kind of  t'ompleteness result for certain infinitary but 
otherwise xceedingly simple formal operations. Essentially, it says that 
any hidden inconsistency in a constituent can be turned into an explicit 
inconsistency (conflict between different parts of a constituent) by omit- 
ring layers of quantifiers. (For a definitior, of trivial inconsistency for 
finite constituents, ee Hintikka [4L The definition can immediately be 
extended to the infinite case.) Lemma 5 is closely related to Scott's lso- 
mo~'  m Theorem (see [ I 1 ]). (As in several other restdts, the presence 
of identity is assumed in Lemma 5.) 
Of these results, Lemma 1 follows from (**). For from the structure 
of a constituent i can be seen that I do not have any chance of choosing 
an infinitely deep disjunct in preference to a finitely deep one an infinity 
of times in the games connected with the C~w. Furthermore~ the only 
way in which ~, play can go on to infinity is for Nature to choose an in- 
finite number cf times an infinitely deep formula in preference to an 
atomic one (or it, the negation of  an atomic one). This suffices to prove 
Lemma 1. 
On the basis of the generalized forna (* ** ) of (* * ) Lemma 1 can be 
extended to all constituents Cua. For it is easily seen that the only way 
in which Nature can avoid making more choices of a deeper formula in 
preference to a shallower one than I do in the game associated with a 
constituent is to choose a negated or unnegated atomic sentellce at some 
stage or other. 
Lemma 2 can be proved by the following construction (intuitive out- 
line only). Given ~),~ of cardinality X, we fc)rm the cartesian power IEq 
(t ~1 is the domain of ~ ) and interpret it as a set of ~, trees of  length ~o, 
together with a specification of how each element is related to tile lower 
ones (and to itself). Letting all isomorphic trees and isomorphic parts of 
trees coincide we obtain essentially the kind o" tree strncture that a con- 
stituent C:,~ has. In order to make it to conform mote precisely to the 
definition of a constituent, it suffices to carry out the following additional 
steps of construction: 
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(i) Add a unique lowest element, with the associated information that 
it is to be the "'conjunction" (i.e., to be mapped to A) of the existentially 
quantified least elements of  the X previously separate trees plus the uni- 
versally quantified isjunction of the same 3, previously lowest elements. 
(ii) With each element n, associate the information that n is a conjunc- 
tion whose conjuncts will be (a) the elements covering it, (h) all the atomic 
formulas or negations of atomic formulas which specify how n is related 
to the elements lower down in the same branch (and how n is related to 
itself), (c) the universally quantified isjur:ction of all the elements cover- 
ing n. 
These steps are to be carried out from the bottom to the top. From this 
intuitive outline it can be seen how the precise definition of the constitu- 
ent in question is obtained. 
Lemma 3 can be proved by using the structure of Cu~ to form an 
infinit= set of finite sentences, We simply introduce a new constant Ct' 
tbr each attributive constituent C! of C~u. From each (2) and from ( l )  
we then form the set S of finilat), sentences consisting of 
t3) tVxo l . , . (Vxk_ l ) tCt ' (x  o . . . . .  xk_ l )  
D(:lx~)Ct'~(x o ..... xk_ l ,xk ) )  (hE l l ) ,  
(4) (VXo) '" (Vxk- l  ) (Ct ' (Xo,  , . ,  xk -  1 ) 
-~ (+-)A:(xo .. . . .  xk 1)) ( i~ J ) ,  
~5) (~xo)C't;(x o) (~  l ) .  
Let now ~ be a model of C.~.  We define an expansion ~ '  of  ~ by 
interpreting the new constants Ct' as follows: 
0 '~,  = ((a 0 ..... ak_ | )E  1~92{k : 
~ Ct(x o .. . . .  xk_ l ) [ao~. . : ,ak_ l ] ) .  
l 'hen it is obvious that ~ '  is a mode[ c fS .  Since in S there are fewer than 
existential formul~.s (as implicanda), S has a model .~' of a cardinality 
< ~ which is a submodel orbit '. We show that 97' (hence also its reduct to 
the original anguage) is a model of C.~.  Let us suppose that C.~ is not 
trine in ~' .  Then, since G(C~ ,~2') is determinate, Nature has a winning 
strategy, i e., a strategy which yields a false atomic sentence (or the nega- 
tion of a true one) lot all my counterstrategies. Since C~ holds in ~J~' 
and ~'  is a submodel of ~ ' ,  this means that in ~'  a c~rtain kind of court- 
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table sequence of  individuals i lacking. Thus there is a chain of existent~_l- 
ly quantified subformulas (a chain of  existentially quantified nested attri- 
butive constituents) in C~ such that Nature's winning strategy consists 
merely of  Nature's uccessive choices of a finite number of these subformulas 
(this number depends on my choices) and of the final choice of  an atomic 
sentence (or negation of  one). Each of my counterstrategies consists merely 
of  my choices of individuals of W. Thus there is a sequence of nested attri- 
butive constituents in CK, ~ : 
Cto (Xo), ..., C tk -  1 (Xo . . . . .  xk  _ t ) . . . .  
with the corresponding conjunctions of atomic subformulas or their nega- 
tions (of. (2), above): 
A (±)Ai(xo) ..... A (+-)At(x o ..... xk_ 1) .... 
iEJo J~Jlc-J 
such that 
9~' ~ ~ (3x  O) .., (3xk .  1 ) ( iA  ° (±) Ai(Xo ) a ,., 
^ A (±)A . (x  0 .... x k ~), . . . ) .  
i~],~_~ I 
But, on the oh~er h~ald, 
SN (~17¢ O) ... (::mxk_l)... (Ao  (±)Ai(xo) ^  ... 
A A (±)Aj(x O, ...,-vk.. | ), ...), 
i~]1¢-1 
whence we have a contradiction. Hence ~t' is a model of C~ ~ of cardinaiity 
<g.  
Lemma 4 can be proved by showing how to construct aconstitutive model 
set (in the sense of Hintikka [4], p. 275) in which a given trivially consis- 
tent constituent C~ can be imbedded. The construction is too compli- 
cated to be given in 15.tl here. (It is nevertheless easy to see that the exis- 
tence of  such a constitutive model set suffices to show the zatisfiabiliW 
of  C~ .) The main underlying id~,a is the following, Since each quanti- 
fier in a C,w occurs within the scope of only finite number of  other 
quantifiers: it suffices for the satisfiability of  C~ that any finite number 
of individuals introduced by its quantifiers be compatible. And this can 
be seen to be guaranteed by the trivial consistency o fC~.  
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C~ in a model ~ (o fa  cardinality < K) follows from the CoroUary to 
Lemma 2 and is seen by observing how my strategies and Nature's trate- 
gies in the two games associated with ~ correspond to each other. (This 
need not hold of  models of larger cardinalities.) By the compactness of  
L,~,~, S' is satisfiable i f f  all its finite subsets are. Hence CK~ is satisfiabk 
i f f  all its approximations are satisfiable. 
It follows from Lmma 4 that a C~,~ is either true in a given fixed 
model ~ ,  or else Nature has a strategy in the game correlated with CK~ 
which wins after a fixed finite number of moves at the latest. 
]_emma 5 is a limited ¢ategoricity result. It can be proved by precisely 
the same hack-and-forth meth')d as serves to prove the RyU-Nardzewski 
~-categoricity theorem in the finite case by means of constituents. 
Let ~q! and ~2 be :wo countable models satisfying a constituent Cw~,  
say (1), and let t ~ l  I = {a 0, a l ,  .., ) and [ ~121 = {b0, b 1, ..' ) '  To establish 
the desired isomorphis~n, we first see which Ctz-(x0) (i E 1) is satisfied 
by a 0, and we correlate with it the first b/satisfying the same Ctj(Xo). 
Then we correlate bo (unless j = 0) with the first a k such that (a0, a,~) 
satisfies the same Ct h (Y0, x l ) of (1) in ~1 as is satisfied by (b/, b O) in 
2. Continuing the same way ad infinitum we can clearly establish an 
isomorphism between ~1 and ~2.  
The generalization of Lemma 5 is established by continuing this con- 
struction by transfinite induction. This proof at once shows why for ¢o~- 
categoricity we need descending chains of subformulas of length cop. 
It may be of interest o compare the infinite constituents CKw with 
fir~ite ones. There are in fact many close connections. For instance, Lem- 
ma 4 shows that the concepts of  trivial and nontrivial inconsistency 
coincide for infinite constituents. An infinite constituent is consistent, 
we may p~r:'~aps say, iff each of its parts mirrors every other one. In fact, 
Lemma 4 teils us a l~t of  the structure of  satisfiable infinite constituents 
Speaking rather roughly, a satisfiable infinite CK~ differs from a satis- 
l~able sequence of deeper and deeper constituents (i.e., from a consistent 
complete f~nitary theory) in that C~ e.g. specifies which types are 
realized in every model or" C~.  (Note that each finitary n-type can be 
represented by a sequence of  increasingly deeper and deeper constituents 
with n free variables.) 
It is also seen that all the models of a C~,~ are saturated in the sense of 
the natur~ extension of this notion to infinitary types: as soon as 
(a0, ,'., an- 1 ) realizes a given n-type T 1 (in Ns~ ) compatible with a given 
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CK~ and as soon as T 2 is a (n + I )-type which includes T 1 , it follows that 
there is in the same model ol C~w an a n such that (a o . . . . .  an -  1, an)  realizes 
In view of the finer partition created by types in N ,~ than by those 
in Lww, the similarity of our Lemma 5 with Scott's lsomo~hism Theo- 
rem might seem surprising, for what this Theorem says is that a given 
countable model ~ can be described up to isomorphism already in L~I ~ . 
However, a moment's reflection shows what the situation is. In the same 
way as the infinite sequence of closed finite constituents satisfied in 
defines a complete theory of L~,  each type realized in ~ is defined by 
a countably infinite sequence of  constit,aents with free variables. Hence 
we can specify which (finitary) types are realized in ~ simply by having 
countably infinite conjunctions and disjunctions of finitary expressions 
within the scope of  a quantifier, as is allowed in L~.  By letting this 
construction ramify in all directions, we obtain the desired description 
o f~ in Lwa,~. 
• What this shows is essentially that the constituents C~,,~ are not essen- 
tially stronger than the expressions of  L~,o ,  as far as countable models 
are concerne~l. Does this observation carry over to the rest of the language 
No~ ~? 
This question is a specia case of the broader problem of the relation 
of the constituents Y~ to the rest of  the language N~, o . In L~,  consti- 
tuents of  depth d we e the strongest expressions of tiffs depth, and each 
sentence of this depth had a normal form as a disjunction of such consti- 
tuents. Can we find an analogue to this privileged position of the fiuitary 
constituents in infinitary languages in their iufinitary counterparts, too? 
There is a certain amount of analogy, here, but also a complication. 
This complication can be described in heuristic terms as follows. When 
we try to transform an arbitrary sentence ~ of N~ into its "normal form". 
everything may first seem to work smoothly. The distributive laws that 
are relevant here may admittedly lead to disjunctions of  the length ~ (or 
even longer ones). Hence the resulting "norma! form" of  • is not repre- 
sentable in N~ itself. However, in some cases this "normal form" is 
nevertheless till a disjunction of some of the constituents C~o in the 
sense that for '~ there is a set S of constituents C~, o such that ~ is true 
in a model i f fa  member of S is. 
What messes up things here is not any distributive law but the idea that 
a constituer~t C~ specifies of  each attributive constituent whether it is 
satisfied or not. (The cardinality of the set of all such attributive consti- 
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talents is of  course at least equal to ~.) It may be that ~b as it were deals 
explicitly with fewer than ~ of them only, but that it implies that ~ or 
more of them are satisfied in some models of q~. (This happens, e.g., in 
the case of  "I, = A T ~ Nto,,o, where T is the countable basis of a complete 
L~ theor3 ' which has uncountably many types ot:elements.) Then an 
attempt o turn a sentence 4~ of N~ into its "normal form" leads out- 
side the set of the constituents C~ and outside the language N~o~ alto- 
gether. For this reason, we might say, the constituents C~ have a pri'~- 
ileged position in N~ only im.ofar as models of cardinality < ~: are con- 
cerned. 
This informal argument nevertheless hows at once what more can be 
said here. In building up the constituents in the "normal forms" of  the 
sentences of  N~ o we do not have to go to arbitrarily large cardinals 
X> x. It can be that there is a cardinal 7(~P) such that the "normal 
lbrm" of a sentence ¢ belongs to NT(~) w. Then this sentence ~ of  
N~,j is in a natural sense equivalent with a disjunction of  constitu- 
ents in N.~(~,)~. Some of  the disjuncts are of  the form C~,j. Now which 
subsets CN~,  CL~,o of the sets of the sentences of N~,  L ,~,  respec- 
tively, are closed with respect o the formation of normal forms remains 
to be studied. CN,~ ~ and CL,~ ~ are clearly the sets of those sentences 
of N~lw,  L~t~,  respectively, for which 
(i) the number of the isomorphism classes of countable models of 09 
is ~ 60, 
(ii) for every model ~ of • there is a countable model ~ such that 
and 'J/are elementarily equivalent in N~t ~ or L~,~,  respectively. 
A rich field of applications i constituted by the definability properties 
of the languages N~.  Since the methods used earlier by Hintikka, Tuo- 
mela, and Rantala (see [ 3, 5,101 ) in their studies of definability in L,o,o 
turn on the properties of constituents, they can be extended to the N~,  
and many of the central results concerning different kinds of definability 
in L~ will consequently carry over almost intact to the N~.  
We shall consider here only certain generalizations of Scott's and 
S~enonius' definability theorems. 
We shall deal with languages of the type r and of the type r u {P} where 
P is monadic. If ~ is a model of  type "r, then (gR, X) is an expansion of  
"~ to r tJ {p). If C,~ (r, P) is a constituent in the language N~ (r, P) of 
the type r u (P),  its reduct to the language N~ (z) of the type r is de- 
noted by ( '~  (r). 
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It is known that Scott's definability result (see [ 1 ! ])  in L~,. ~. for coun- 
table models (Theorem 1, below) cannot be generalized in a straightfor- 
ward way for models of arbitrary cardinalities A > eo in any languoge 
L .  x = O~ L K x. But Kueker has shown in [ 7 ] that the generalization hol ~s 
for cardinalities X with effX) = co (Theorem 2, below). In Theorem 2, ~+ 
is the least cardinal greater than ~¢, ~.* = (:Z~<~),e)*, and cff),) is the co- 
finality of X, th~,t is, the least ordinal t~ such that there is a function g 
from a into X with sup{g(~): ~ ~ a)  = X. 
Theorem 1. Let ~ be a countable model and X c [iq[. Then the follol*~ 
ing are equivalent: 
0)1 X is left f ixed in every automorphism o f  ~ .  
(ii) z :here is a formula q~(x ) o f  L~I ,, (r) such that 
(~ ,  X) ~ (Vx) (Px ~- ~(x) ) .  
Theorem 2. Let ~ be a model o f  cardinality ~, where cffk) = w. Let 
Xc I~1. Then (i) l is equ/valent to: 
(ii) 2 ther~ is a formula d#(x ) o f  La. ~,(r) such that 
(~,~, X) ~ (¥x)  (Px ~ 4~(x)). 
Theorem 2 is a consequence of Chang's generalization (in [ t ] ) of 
Scott's Isomorph'sm Theorem. It is known that the explicit definability 
of P in (~Y~, X) by a formula of  L .  ~ is not equivalent with (i) z when 3, is 
an uncountable regular cardinal. 
We can now state a ~emantical condition which captures the explicit 
definability of P in (9~, X) by a formula of N~w (r) = U, N,w (r) and 
which holds for all cardinalities of  models. 
A mapping is called a partial automorphistn of 9~ if it in a set I of 
isomorphisms between two substructures of  ~ such that I has the back- 
and-forth property. 
Theorem 3. Let ~ be a model o f  eardinality t¢ and ) [c  j 9~[, Then the 
following are equivalent: 
(i) 3 X is left f ixed m every partial automorphism Of ~ . 
(ii) 3 there are formulas d9 , (x ) o f  N~. ~ (r) (# < 71 ~ K)slwh that 
(~l, P) I= (Vx) (Px ~ V<,~ , ( ; ) ) .  
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The proof is obtained immediately when we observe the following. Let 
C~. ~(r, P) = A t (~x o) Ct~(r, P;x o) ^  (Vx o) V t Cti(r, P, x o) 
be the constituent which is true in (~,  X) (cf. Lemma 2, above). Then 
(03 holds iff for all i, / E 1, Ct i (r, x O) ~ Ct](¢, x O) when Px 0 occurs in 
Ct~( r, P, x a ) and ~Px 0 occurs in Ctltr, P, x o ). 
The corresponding known result for LK. w as we,ll as Scarfs Definabi- 
lity Theorem are clearly consequences ofTheoret~l 3.
The straightforward analogue to Svenonius" Theorem (in [2] ) for Lo~ o~ 
(Theorem 4, below) does not hold for L~ ~, as Motohashi has shown 
in [9]. Motohashi states an exhmsion of Sveuonius Theorem in the sense 
that Svenonius' Theorem can be proved from it. But Motohashi's result 
does not yield the definability of P. 
Theorem 4. l.br any theory T of L,,,~ (r, P) the following are equivalent: 
0)4 for any model (~.~1, X) of T. (i) l holds, 
(ii) 4 there are formulas ~i(x) of L~u (r) such that 
T ~ V t (Vx) (1~ -~ cl, i(x)). 
From Theorem 3 we obtain immediately ageneralizatirm of Svenonius' 
Theorem for N,~o (Theorem 5, below). From it we can tlso see why the 
straightforward analogue to Svenonius' Theorem does not hold in any 
N~.~, either. 
Theorem 5. For any sentence ® oC N~(r ,P )  for which 7(0) exists the 
following are equivalent: 
(05 for any model (971, X) of O, (i) 3 holds, 
(ii) 5 there are jbrmulas ¢,u (x) of NTee) ~ (~) (tt < r~ < 3"(0)) such that 
O~ V (Vx)(Px =- f f , (x)) .  
Corollary 6(K). For any sentence O of CN~(r,P),  (05 is equivalent o: 
There are formulas On(x) of N~ (¢) (p < rl < K) such that 
0 ~ V n (¥x) (Px =- 4, (x)). 
It may be said that Theorem 5 does the same for definability in a 
theory as Theorem 3 does for definability in a model. A comparison with 
114 J. Hinn~ka. V. Rantala / A new approach to infinitary !anguaggs 
L~ o (see Theorem 4, above, and [ 10, pp. 63-64] ) shows that Theorem 
5 is a direct generalization of what happens in L~.  The only essential 
difference is the step from • to 7(0), and the reasons for having to take 
it were already been explained above. In particular, Corollary 6(w t ) 
gives us a partial extension of Svenonius' Theorem for N~,  for it im- 
plies Sveno~:ius' Theorem. Since a Scott sentence is in CN~ ~, an appli- 
cation of Ct, rollary 6(w t )to it implies also ScoWs Definability Theorem. 
We can al:~o generalize similarly the theorems of Kueker and of Chang 
and Makkai to N~ by considering attributive constituents of sentences 
of the form C,~ 0", P) with several free variables. It also seems possible 
that these definability results can be generalized to some languages N~ 
with a > co. 
The languages N~,~ with a > w dXfer sharply from the languages N~, o , 
and present much greater problems In some sense, their difficulty grows 
disconcertingly fast. Already in Nw. to+n, with some n < ~, we can ibr- 
mulate xtremely strong statements, including tile special continuum 
hypothesis, the exis*ence of the least upper bound and the greatest lower 
bound for any ,:et of rationals, Souslin's hypothesis, etc. These languages 
need il~ any case a separate investigation. 
However, already at present stage of investigation it can be seeu that 
one possiYqlity which the languages N~ seem to open is to systematize 
the kinds of constructions u ed, e.g., by Chang, Kueker, Malitz, and Scott. 
Note. After an earlier version of this paper was completed and offered 
to Annals ,  our attention was called to the work of Dr. Ants Tants of 
Tartu, Esthonia, USSR. Because of language problems, we still have not 
been able to compare notes, but it is already clear that Dr. Tants had 
been examining infinffely deep languages at some length well before us. 
The following papers of his seem to be relevant here: 
Das Definieren der Wahrheitswerte als Ausdrucke, Trans. Tartu State Univ. 
(1967); 
Die Logik als Klassifikat on der Ausdrucke, ibid. (1968), 
Die semantische Interpretation yon Forme!n durch verallgemei~ertc Beth- 
Modelte und pseudo-Boolesche Atgebren, ibid. (1972), 
Die formale Deduktion der tautologischen Forrneln in pseudo-Booleschen 
Algebren, ibid. (1974). 
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